About a year after the outbreak of the Revolution and despite the fall of Tripolitza, the military and administrative centre of the Morea, there were still Ottoman pockets in important strategic points of the Peloponnese. These were the forts of Methoni and Koroni, Patras and Rio, Corinth and Nauplion. The impossibility of taking these strongholds led to sieges that lasted several months, similar to those of Tripolitza. The aim was to force the Ottomans to surrender by depriving them of water, food and munitions inside the forts and by cutting off communications between the various Ottoman strongholds. The separate negotiations with the Albanian armed men was also a tactic frequently adopted by chieftains such as Kolokotronis. In addition, although Greek ships obstructed the approach of the Ottoman ships to the Peloponnesian coasts, in some cases it was impossible to prevent the provision and reinforcement of the besieged. With the exception of the fort of Corinth, which fell at the beginning of January 1822, the other sieges were not effective.

The fall of Ali Pasha at the end of January of the same year liberated a great part of the Ottoman forces which were until then had been deployed at Ioannina and the greater region of Epirus. Thus, in June 1822 a great number of troops (about 30,000) with Mahmud Dramali Pasha at the lead, were concentrated at Zeytun (Lamia). Their objective was to subjugate the Peloponnese. The impressive number of soldiers passed through west-central Greece without losses, frighening the local inhabitants as it went by. At the beginning of July it passed the Isthmus and entered Corinth. The Greek Revolutionary Administration which had settled there at the beginning of the year fled to the islands of the Argosaronic Gulf; Akrokorinthos and Argos were abandoned. After the initial panic and flight revolutionary defences were organized. The main concern was the destruction of the crops and wells to deprive the Ottomans of water and food. Indeed, very soon provisions began to run out and consequently the armed men of Dramali became exhausted. This was also achieved by the coordination of action of the Peloponnesians with the chieftains of Rumeli, an action which impeded the provision of the Ottomans from behind the line. Thus, the advance towards the besieged Nauplion was not accomplished and Dramali turned back toward Corinth. This movement had been predicted by Kolokotronis who had occupied strategic positions in narrow passages. On 26 July Dramali's army suffered great loss at Dervenakia and Agios Sostis and after two days at Agionori he fled to Corinth, having lost about the one-third of his forces. He was besieged and in the following two months the losses from diseases, exhaustion and the unsuccessful attempts at desertion were even greater. At the end of October Corinth passed once again under the control of the Greek Revolutionary Administration while a few days later the forts of Nauplion (Palamidi, Itche Kale) were under its control as well.

A year later, at the end of 1823, the strongholds of Patras and Rio in the north-west, Methoni and Koroni in the south-west were still controlled by the Ottomans. The sieges continued during the whole of the following year (1824) without any success. In addition, the oppositions among the revolutionaries which increased toward the second half of 1823, and which led to armed conflicts in 1824, did not permit sufficient preparations to meet a new Ottoman expedition. This was the situation at the beginning of 1825 when Ibrahim Pasha landed on the coast of Messenia, having previously repressed the last revolutionary centres on Crete. The army of the Egyptian allies of the Sublime Porte, which was organized according to western models, was the greatest threat for the Peloponnese four years after the declaration of the Revolution.