Russia's disapproval of the Greek Revolution at the Congress of Laibach is expressed in its agreement with the principle of legality, which constituted the main diplomatic thrust of the Great Powers from 1815. According to this principle, each act that contested the legitimacy of the regimes and/or the territorial integrity of the subjected states was condemned. However, the particular interests of Russia in south-eastern Europe and its aspirations to control Ottoman territories were favoured by the Greek Revolution. Furthermore, the intervention of Russia in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire had been established with the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774), when Russia was acknowledged as a protecting power of the Orthodox Christians who lived on Ottoman territories.

The reason Russia intervened once again was the pillorying and hanging of Patriarch Gregorios V and the persecutions of the Christians, especially in Constantinople and in towns of Asia Minor, after the Spring of 1821. The particularly strict note to the Sublime Porte in the beginning of July of the same year and the interruption of Russian-Ottoman diplomatic relations provoked tension and military preparation in both countries. In this way, Russia managed to maintain the Greek cause despite the fact that the condemnation of the Greek Revolution was established at the Congress of Verona, in the last months of 1822. Despite the resignation of Kapodistrias from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 1822 it appears that the possibility of a change of policy towards the Greek cause similar to that expressed for the Danubian principalities was gaining ground. The so-called three-part plan which was proposed by the Russians in January 1824 was heading in this direction. It was the first proposition for the creation of an autonomous Greek state, that would pay tribute to the Ottoman Empire. These states would provide the outlet to the Mediterranean Russia had sought since the previous century.

The incapacity of the Ottoman Empire to quell the Greek Revolution and the fear that the creation of a Greek state would further Russian interests in the eastern Mediterranean altered Great Britain's attitude towards the Greek cause. Britain's initial negative view, expressed particularly by the English authorities of the Ionian Republic, was soon changed with the gradual adoption of more favourable views towards the Greeks. The appointment of George Canning to the top echelons of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 1822 contributed to this change. The first signs of the new policy appeared in spring 1823 when Great Britain acknowledged the Greek revolutionaries as a warring nation. Furthermore, it seems that during the following months financial circles in London were encouraged unofficially to offer loans to the Greek Revolutionary Administration (1824, 1825). These loans, for which national land was mortgaged, signified the indirect acknowledgement of a quasi Greek state, which would pay back the loans in the future.

To summarize, the promotion of the different and often conflicting economic and geopolitical interests of the two powerful states, Great Britain and Russia, eventually resulted in a diplomatic alliance favourable to the Greeks. Particularly after 1825-1826, when the Greek Revolution was unsuccessful in the battle fields, the initiatives of the two Powers, which were followed by France but not Austria or Prussia, obliged the Ottoman Empire to accept the creation of an independent Greek state.